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Heidegger’s goal in this lecture is to carefully designate the range of study in the separate 
sciences of philosophy and theology. This investigation then discerns whether these sciences 
occupy the same range, whether they have different foundations but overlapping themes, whether 
one stands prior to the other, and finally, whatever their differences or similarities, how they may 
interact with each other in a fruitful communication. 
His driving thesis is the distinction between theology and philosophy, as that of an ontic 
science (theology) contrasted with the ontological science (philosophy). His “formal definition” 
of “science” is “the founding disclosure, for the sheer sake of disclosure, of a self-contained 
region of beings, or of being.”11 A science either studies beings, or being. The distinction 
between ontic and ontological lies in whether the science discloses beings-as-such or being in 
general. An ontic science “thematize[s] a given being that in a certain manner is already 
disclosed prior to scientific disclosure [emphasis mine]” (PT 41), i.e. an ontic science studies a 
specific being with an already-assumed notion of being. The specific being studied by this 
science is what Heidegger calls the positum, thus making any ontic science a positive science. 
Botany, for example, studies the specific scientific being of plants, and so in that field plants act 
as the positum of botanic study.  
In contrast, ontology “demands a fundamental shift of view: from beings to being” (PT 
41). Ontology makes no specific being its positum, but rather studies being itself. The two 
methods of scientific inquiry—positive science and philosophy—no matter the possible 







Based on this distinction between the ontic and the ontological, Heidegger puts forward 
the thesis “that theology is a positive science, and as such, therefore, is absolutely different from 
philosophy [emphasis his]” (PT 41), which Heidegger classifies as the sole ontological science.  
In order to argue this, Heidegger must first prove both the positive and scientific nature of 
theology. He chooses specifically Christian theology for investigation. (He admits that there can 
be a different theology besides a Christian one, although he simply defers the question in this 
essay.) 
Heidegger begins with a discussion of the specific object, or positum of Christian 
theology which makes it a positive science. Heidegger examines a range of possibilities for this 
positum, starting with Christianity itself. Here theology would be the science of Christianity “as 
something that has come about historically, witnessed by the history of religion and spirit and 
presently visible through its institutions… as a widespread phenomenon in world history” (PT 
43). Essentially, it would be church history. This positum would be wrong, however, because 
“theology itself belongs to Christianity” (PT 43). An analysis of Christianity “as something that 
has come about in world history” would not be theology, for theology “belongs to the history of 
Christianity, is carried along by that history” (PT 43). Theology cannot consist in in the form of a 
detached, objective observation. There must be a self-awareness of theology’s place within 
Christianity in order for it to be fruitful.  
Proceeding from this it would seem that theology is then a “historical development of its 
consciousness of history,” and thus the positum would then be the self-consciousness of 
Christianity in world history (PT 43). This classification would also be inaccurate, however, 
because “theology does not belong to Christianity” (PT 43) as mere historical self-awareness 
carried along by its Christian context. Rather, it is a “knowledge of that which initially makes 
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possible Christianity” (PT 43); that is, the practice of theology is not only influenced by the 
history of Christianity but is also that which makes that history come about as an event in the 
first place. While theology is bound to Christianity as a study within it and carried along by it, 
theology no less also produces a knowledge which reciprocally affects Christianity, in fact makes 
it possible. There is no theological knowledge without Christianity, and there is no Christianity 
without theological knowledge. This knowledge is “what we call Christianness.” Therefore, the 
positum of theology is Christianness, or what Heidegger also calls faith.  
 What is the nature of this faith? The common understanding is belief in a certain set of 
tenets or doctrines. Heidegger, however, defines faith in a very Kierkegaardian—indeed, 
existential—manner. His preliminary conception of faith is “a way of existence of human Dasein 
that, according to its own [way of existence] …arises… from that which is revealed in and with 
this way of existence, from what is believed” (PT 44). The thing “revealed” to the Christian case 
is “Christ, the crucified God” (PT 44). Thus the existence of Christian Dasein conveys the 
crucified Christ. But this revelation cannot happen through detached knowledge but only “in 
believing.” This revelation “is not a conveyance of information about present, past, or imminent 
happenings; rather, this imparting” is the event in which one part-takes “in the event that is 
revelation itself,” “which is realized only in existing” (PT 44). This part-taking of existence in 
revelation is the event in which Dasein “places one’s entire existence— as a Christian existence, 
i.e., one bound to the cross—before God” [emphasis mine] (PT 44). 
The event of this placing oneself before God is also a realization of past, pre-Christian 
existence in a state of “forgetfulness of God.” The realization of this pre-existence places one at 
“the mercy of God grasped in faith,” which then requires a new existence in which Dasein 
“becomes a slave, is brought before God, and is thus born again [emphasis his]” (PT 44). Again, 
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this faith and event of rebirth is “not some more or less modified type of knowing” (PT 44). It is 
a constant “appropriation of revelation that co-constitutes” the continuing existence of the 
Christian Dasein. Here, Heidegger arrives at his formal definition of faith: 
the believing-understanding mode of existing in the history revealed, i.e., 
occurring, with the Crucified [emphasis his] (PT 45). 
 
 This faith is Heidegger’s positum for theology. As a positive science of faith, theology 
then is the disclosure of the “totality of this being that is disclosed by faith” (PT 45). 
 It is not enough that theology has a positum, however, as Heidegger must also prove 
theology’s scientific nature. This scienticity is not given, as there is always the possibility that 
“faith would totally oppose a conceptual interpretation,” making theology a “thoroughly 
inappropriate means of grasping its object, faith” [emphasis his] (PT 45). Heidegger must 
therefore prove theology as a science.  
 As a science of faith, theology is the science of “that which is believed,” which is “not 
some coherent order of propositions about facts or occurrences which we simply agree to” (PT 
45). As we have already discussed, this science of faith is one of a Christian existence, not 
simply one of tenets or doctrines. In this way, theology seems unscientific in that it is by no 
means systematic. Theology, as a science of a Dasein-encompassing faith, is itself a product of 
that faith which it studies, and it is a science only for the purpose of cultivating faithfulness itself 
(PT 46). Here theology again seems circular and unscientific, if approached from a 
Naturwissenschaftlich (natural-scientific) perspective.  
What makes theology scientific, however, is that it is a member of the 
Geisteswissenschaften (the “spiritual sciences,” the humanities). Faith as “the existing relation to 
the Crucified is a mode of historical Dasein, of human existence, of historically being in a history 
that discloses itself only in and for faith” (PT 46). That is, faith exists only as human existence in 
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history, even if this history is a special one revealed only through revelation accepted in faith. 
Faith is historical, so—as that which makes faith its positum—theology is “intrinsically 
historical… to the very core a historical science [emphasis his]” (PT 46). This is what makes 
theology scientific: that it is historical as a study of the being of Christian Dasein throughout 
history. However, it is not merely a specific realm of the “profane historical sciences,” for it is 
guided systematically beyond a mere analysis of the past. It is systematic in that it grasps “the 
substantive content and the specific mode of being of the Christian occurrence… solely as it is 
testified to in faith and for faith [emphasis his]” (PT 45). It grasps Christian existence as it acts 
throughout history, not as it is historically determined. This systematic grasping occurs primarily 
through study and exegesis of the scriptures, then secondarily through church history and history 
of dogma (PT 46). Thus, theology is “systematic not by constructing a system, but on the 
contrary by avoiding a system” that “first breaks up the totality of the content of faith” into a 
series of unhistorical propositions and axiomatic statements (PT 45). The goal of historical, 
systematic theology is “to place the believer who understands conceptually into the history of 
revelation” (PT 47). This goal is what gives theology its historically scientific nature. 
While many might not be convinced of theology’s scientific nature due to its complete 
dependence upon faith and revelation within scriptures and the church, Heidegger sees this 
dependence as what gives theology its independence from the other sciences, and thus what 
makes theology a true science. An analysis of Christianity, God, or religion in general without 
this dependence upon faith would only be a concentration in one of the profane sciences, whether 
it be a history of Christianity or a philosophy or psychology of religion. It would simply be 
derivative of one of these ‘profane’ disciplines. Theology is a “fully autonomous ontic science” 
as long as “all theological knowledge is grounded in faith itself, originates out of faith, and leaps 
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back into faith” (PT 50). While this fact might not satisfy the unfaithful, only through this 
independence from other fields by reliance on faith does theology have anything new to say to 
the other sciences. True interaction with biology or philosophy comes only through theology’s 
acceptance of its complete dependence upon faith and revelation. 
This idea, on Heidegger’s part, is quite warm towards theology. He does not assume that 
theology is simply a specific area of one of the ‘profane’ sciences or a combination of all these 
sciences into one general reference point. He sees in theology, rather, a wholly independent 
subject matter which the other humanities—e.g. history, psychology, or anthropology—do not 
address nor even can address by their nature. This subject matter, as we have discussed, is the 
Christian faith. It is that ‘totality of Christian existence’ which arises completely of its own 
power, not as a result of political or social causes. Heidegger gives this faith its own power to 
speak from itself, and he states that the goal of theology is to let that faith, as its positive object, 
to speak from itself independently of the other positive sciences. 
Now that Heidegger has classified theology as a positive science, he contrasts it with the 
ontological science, philosophy—and specifically phenomenology. He gives no special 
definition of what ontology is in this text beyond the passing classification as “the study of 
being” already mentioned earlier in this essay. Instead, he moves straight to discussing the 
relationship between philosophy and theology. This lack of clarification is due to the lecture 
being given in 1927, shortly after the publication of his Being and Time, which wholly concerns 
philosophy’s role as fundamental ontology. In the actual lecture, Heidegger did in fact discuss it, 
but during the revision process he “eliminated the first part of the lecture because it consisted of 
a brief summary of his conception of hermeneutic phenomenology… [that] had [already] been 
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dealt with in section 7 of Being and Time.”12 We may assume his ideas about ontology are the 
same in this lecture as the one put forth in Being and Time. Therefore, we will look to his 
ontological definition of philosophy in that text. 
Ontology is the study of being, being itself—not any being in particular nor any method 
of being—but the being of all beings. Heidegger defines ontology as such in Being and Time: 
“the task of ontology is to explain Being itself and to make the Being of entities stand out in full 
relief.”13 The methodology of studying being is phenomenological. That is, methodologically we 
must investigate being by investigating the only being for whom being is an issue: Dasein. 
Ontology is bound to Dasein’s own investigation, simply because our experience of being-in-
itself is bound to our own experience with other beings. Heidegger’s formal definition of 
phenomenology is “to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it 
shows itself” (BT 58). Thus, the goal of ontology, via phenomenology, is “to grasp entities in 
their Being [emphasis his]” (BT 63), which then reveals being-itself, which is “in every case the 
Being of some entity” (BT 61). Contrasted with the ontic sciences—and Heidegger makes sure 
to list theology as the example in paragraph 35—that “give a report in which we tell about 
entities” (BT 63), i.e. those sciences concerned with specific beings, ontology deals with “no 
specific class or genus of entities” but rather the general being of all entities (BT 62). Ontology 










While ontology has no specific being as its object of investigation, it does have a specific 
method and orientation towards beings. For being is in every case the being of a being. As we 
have already touched upon briefly but must now develop further, the proper orientation is 





























Now that Heidegger has defined philosophy and theology as two independent sciences 
separated by their objects of investigation—for theology, the ‘positive’ mode of existence in 
faith, and for philosophy, the phenomenological, non-objective investigation of being—he 
devotes section C to how these two sciences may relate to one another.  
While Heidegger is careful to allow Christian faith’s independence from philosophy, he 
does not allow quite as much for theology: “If faith does not need philosophy, the science of 
faith as a positive science does [emphasis his]” (PT 50). That is, even if Christian faith stays true 
to its own revelatory nature, the scientific investigation of this revelation is nevertheless bound to 
some form of dependence upon philosophy, which is the primordial ontological science. 
However, even this dependence is “uniquely restricted,” only needed in regard to theology’s 
“scientific character” and not its primary disclosure (PT 50). For theology’s “founding and 
primary disclosure of its positum, Christianness,” is wholly independent due to its existence in 
faith alone, which happens “in its own manner” (PT 50). Heidegger admits a tension here 
between allowing Christian faith its own independence while still grounding the scientific 
investigation of it positively upon philosophy. 
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Heidegger sees this tension clearly, again, in theology’s strange place as a ‘science.’ 
Since it is a study of faith—a faith that happens only in the event of revelation—is not theology 
therefore a study of  
something essentially inconceivable, and consequently something whose content 
is not to be fathomed, and whose legitimacy is not to be founded, by purely 
rational means? (PT 50) 
 
Heidegger sees that theology’s subject matter is, by its own definition, ‘inconceivable.’ 
However, there can still be a scientific study of even that which cannot be conceived in a rational 
capacity. In fact, such a scientific investigation is needed if we are to properly to describe 
anything as ‘inconceivable,’ for “only by way of the appropriate conceptual interpretation” 
arriving at “its very limits” does anything reveal itself as inconceivable in the first place (PT 50). 
If not for this conceptual study by use of ratio, faith’s inconceivability would remain “mute” (PT 
50). 
 One of Heidegger’s religious influences, Søren Kierkegaard, 14 comes to a similar notion 
in his pseudonymous Concluding Unscientific Postscript. The appropriate role of ratio within the 
task of gaining selfhood is the “constant holding fast of the paradox.”15 Since subjectivity, and 
therefore truth, can only be apprehended by holding infinitely to the absolute paradox (the Christ 
as God-man), reason must constantly arrive at and admit its own inability to grasp this paradox. 
Without reason’s being pushed ‘to its very limits,’ to quote Heidegger, the paradox could not 











as paradox, there would then be no subjectivity, and no truth. In the case of faith for both 
Kierkegaard and Heidegger, ratio must conceive its own inability to grasp revelation, so that the 
inconceivability of revelation shows itself in full. 
 Thus we have theology’s rational-scientific task of “interpretation of faithful existence” 
(PT 50). Where does philosophy come in? Given the thesis that theology is an ontic science, 
theology as an ontic science is grounded upon a “preliminary (although not explicitly known), 
preconceptual understanding of what and how such a being is” (PT 50). This “preconceptual 
understanding” is an ontology. Christian theology is an ontic interpretation, and every “ontic 
interpretation operates on the basis, at first and for the most part concealed, of an ontology” (PT 
50). Because of this, theology is ontically dependent on the ground of fundamental ontology, and 
thereby upon philosophy. 
 Heidegger immediately qualifies this ontic dependence. Notions such as “the cross, sin, 
etc.” are specifically Christian concepts, and they “manifestly belong to the ontological context 
of Christianness [emphasis mine] (PT 50). Christianness, Christian faith, is only disclosed in 
faith and through faith. How then could concepts only disclosed through faith—it is important to 
note that Heidegger goes so far as to declare that they are disclosed ontologically—have any 
ontic dependence upon a more fundamental ontology? Heidegger suggests that, perhaps, either 
“faith” is “to become the criterion of knowledge for an ontological-philosophical explication,” or 
that “the basic theological concepts [are] completely withdrawn from philosophical-ontological 
reflection...” (PT 51). In the first case, Dasein would practice the specifically Christian mode of 
existential analysis from the directive of faith. It seems at first glance that theology would indeed 
be its own ‘Christian philosophy’ driven by faith, a ‘worldview’ in contrast to the secular 
philosophical ‘worldview’ which lacks revelation. In the second case, theology would be a 
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strangely independent practice, neither ontological due to its revelatory nature nor ontic due to its 
complete lack of an ontological basis or even reference. It would be a wholly independent and 
consistent, yet closed system.16 
 What disallows these two possibilities, however, is the fact that the “explication of basic 
concepts… is never accomplished by explicating and defining isolated concepts with reference to 
themselves alone and then operating with them here and there as if they were playing chips” (PT 
51). That is, it is impossible to analyze theological concepts such as the cross, sin, resurrection 
etc. only in reference to themselves. If such were the case, the closed theological system would 
simply be an abstract construct with no relation to anything else, not least the reality or truth 
which is theology’s goal to disclose. Such a theology would be no more than a game, with 
theological concepts as its ‘playing chips.’ Any correct explication “must take pains to envision 
and hold constantly in view in its original totality the primary, self-contained ontological context 
to which all the basic concepts refer” (PT 51). Theology, no less than any other science, must 
always make reference to the actual world, the ‘original totality’ to which all ‘basic concepts’ 
must refer if they are to disclose anything. This necessity proscribes the second option for 
theology’s practice—though Heidegger does not at this point necessarily proscribe theology’s 
first option, a possibility he will discuss later. 
 How does theology as a whole, then, make reference to the ‘original totality’ to which all 
its concepts of the cross, sin, resurrection, or salvation refer? We must again look to the 










Heidegger’s sense of Christian “rebirth” is that “Dasein’s prefaithful, i.e., unbelieving, existence 
is sublated [aufgehoben] therein” (PT 51). Heidegger uses the German aufgehoben to describe 
this sublation—the Hegelian term that any synthesis contains its previous historical thesis and 
antithesis within itself and brings both to the fore through their sublation. In this case, all 
theological concepts and notions, even if they appear ontological, are positively dependent on a 
pre-ontic and already-assumed understanding of being contained therein. Just as historical 
concepts already have an unstated ontology of what Dasein is as a being, so does theology have 
an assumed, pre-Christian ontology of what Dasein is as a being. While the Christian Dasein is 
existentielly—concretely, ontically—a “new creation,” this ‘new’ Dasein still ontologically 
includes the pre-Christian Dasein in its faithful existence. This sense is illustrated best by 
hyphenating re-birth: while there is a new existence which requires the addition of ‘re-,’ the 
original ‘birth’ still stands within the new existence just as before. 
 Here I must challenge Heidegger’s terms of ontic vs. ontological sublation. He claims 
that the Christian Dasein is a new ontic-existentiell creation, but this assertion seems inconsistent 
with his usual usage of the term. The ontic-existentiell always deals with the what of a specific 
being. Surely no one would suggest that Christian Dasein, upon rebirth, “enter into his mother’s 
womb and be born” again,17 literally becoming a new and completely different being than the 
one he was previously. To quote Bultmann in a way somewhat unrelated to his original intent: 




18	Bultmann, Rudolf. "The Historicity of Man and Faith." Existence and Faith: The Shorter 




birth of the Christian Dasein as an ontological-existential change, one in regards to the how of a 
being, to how this being exists in the world.  
Heidegger most likely, however, has in mind the specific, concrete life situation, or mode 
of existence, in which a Dasein finds itself—this is another way he typically defines ontic-
existentiell. The very specific how Christian Dasein exists could then fit into this ontical 
category. But Christian re-birth still does not fit into this definition. While Christian re-birth is 
always concrete in every instance to a specific human being and his or her life, it varies in so 
many ways that we cannot describe it as so concretely existentiell. One may become a Christian 
quite suddenly after a life of vanity, while another is a Christian seemingly from the beginning of 
their childhood. One may live one’s Christian existence as a missionary in a hostile country, 
while another may live just as Christianly as a pastor in a country church in a free land. What 
underlies all these very different existences and binds them into similarly Christian existences, 
however, are the existential structures inherent in whatever a Christian re-birth means. (We 
admit here for the time being that the question of what these Christian-existential structures 
actually are remains open; these structures so far have not been investigated, at least as explicitly 
existential structures.) The states of being-in-sin and being-in grace, for example, are not merely 
ontical—specific only to each situation—but more primordially ontological ways of being in the 
world, with the existential structures of sin and grace undergirding each mode of existence. It is 
more fitting to describe Christian re-birth as an ontological change concerning the existential 
structures that govern how the Christian exists in any concrete situation, rather than an ontic one 
that is only a concrete mode governed by more primordial structures inherent in every Dasein’s 
existence. We would then reverse Heidegger’s distinction: in the event of re-birth, Dasein’s pre-
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Christian existence is ontologically, not ontically, overcome in faith, while ontically the pre-
Christian existence is included in faith and the new life. 
 But let us now return to Heidegger’s argument. Because, for him, pre-Christian Dasein is 
ontologically present in the new Christian Dasein, all theological concepts “necessarily contain 
that understanding of being [emphasis his] that is constitutive of human Dasein as such, insofar 
as it exists at all” [emphasis mine] (PT 51). Here we apply Bultmann’s statement in its original 
intent, that ‘believing Dasein is always in every case still Dasein.’ Philosophical concepts are 
fundamental structures of all human being; so theology, as a specific mode of human being, is 
dependent on these more primordial structures. Thus theology is dependent upon philosophy, 
simply because its concepts are grounded in the fundamental, ontological understanding of 
Dasein ‘insofar as it exists at all.’ 
 Heidegger uses the example of sin to illustrate this dependence. Sin is specifically 
Christian, “manifest only in faith, and only the believer can factically exist as a sinner” (PT 51). 
But since sin is the Christian interpretation of pre-Christianness, and this pre-Christian Dasein is 
a basic “phenomenon of existence,” the “content of the concept itself [emphasis his]… calls for a 
return to the [ontological] concept of guilt” (PT 51). Thus the theologian must “originally and 
appropriately” bring this “basic constitution of Dasein” to light “in a genuine ontological 
manner…” (PT 51). And the better the theologian commits to this task, the better he is served in 
using ontological guilt “as a guide for the theological explication of sin” (PT 52). 
 Heidegger again, however, tows a fine line in this illustration. According to his analysis 
of the relationship between sin and guilt, “it seems that it is primarily philosophy that decides 
about theological concepts” (PT 52). Again, Bultmann’s maxim concerning believing Dasein as 
firstly dependent on the concept of Dasein comes to the fore. The theologian simply appropriates 
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philosophical concepts from fundamental ontology into a certain ontical mode, in this case 
Christian existence.19 If such were the case, Heidegger asks, “is not theology being led on the 
leash by philosophy?” (PT 52). Such leading around on a leash endangers the independence 
Heidegger aims to give theology as a science, so his answer is a resounding No. Because sin, as a 
theological concept, is based upon revelation in faith, it is “not to be deduced rationally from the 
concept of guilt” (PT 52). The fact of sin cannot be found via rational inspection into Dasein’s 
basic state of ontological guilt, for sin is not identical to nor even “in the least bit evidenced” (PT 
52) by pre-Christian guilt. Instead, the basic philosophical concept of guilt can only help the 
theological concept of sin as a ‘correction’ or ‘co-direction’ that relates the revelation (in this 
case, sin) to pre-Christian content (in this case, guilt). A more fitting interpretation of the original 
German might be ‘general orientation,’ rather than the stronger term of ‘co-direction;’ because 
the original ontological concept of guilt really gives no ‘direction’ beyond a fundamental 
clarification of the region of sin. Even with guilt’s general orientation, the primary direction, 
“the source of [sin’s] Christian content, is given only by faith” (PT 52). Faith is still the primary 
directive of the theological analysis of sin, and the ontological concept of guilt can only offer a 
general orientation of the pre-Christian state of Dasein.  
 Here Heidegger roughly formulates the relationship between philosophy and theology: 
Philosophy is the formally indicative ontological corrective of the ontic and, in 
particular, of the pre-Christian content of basic theological concepts [emphasis 











Theology keeps its independence through the use of faith as its directive for conceptual analysis. 
Ideas of sin or the cross spawn only from the revelation of faith. But philosophy guides theology 
in helping it clarify the pre-Christian state of Dasein as Dasein—which in every case the 
Christian Dasein always remains, obviously, as Dasein.20 Philosophy is “formally indicative” by 
helping theology locate the starting ontological “regions” of its concepts. If sin is going to be a 
“concept of existence,” then it must locate itself first within an ontological region of pre-
Christian Dasein, and this region is guilt (PT 52).  
 Heidegger is careful to note that philosophy does not lead theology on a leash through 
this relationship, because it does not “serve to bind but, on the contrary, to release and point to 
the specific, i.e., credal source of the disclosure of theological concepts” (PT 52). Philosophy 
only acts as a basic starting point, where theology can clarify beginning pre-Christian ontological 
concepts—e.g. guilt, time, death—and then depart from these basic concepts once theology 
clarifies its own “credal” sources, i.e. its revelation, in contrast to the basic pre-Christian 
Dasein’s form of existence.   
 But while theology may make use of philosophy in this basic, co-directive way, 
philosophy does not have much at all to do with theology. Even philosophy’s role as ‘co-
directive’ of theology is not apparent to philosophy itself: “it can never be established by 
philosophy itself or for its own purpose, that it must have such a corrective function for 
theology” (PT 52-53). Philosophy cannot, on its own accord, assume its place as a directive for 
theology, even as a modest co-directive. This is in contrast to philosophy’s assumptive authority 
towards all the other ‘positive’ sciences—such as Heidegger’s example, physics— where 





foundation” [emphasis mine] (PT 53). Philosophy can offer the possibility of use for theology, 
but this use can never, for philosophy, go beyond mere possibility.  
 The relationship between the two sciences, then, is wholly up to the theologian’s 
discretion. Heidegger gives good reason for the theologian to make use of philosophy, because if 
theology wants “to be factical with respect to the facticity of faith,” then we would assume a 
basic ontology would be useful with respect to theology’s discussion of man’s basic “facticity” 
(PT 53). But, again, the theologian and not the philosopher must decide whether this is so. Only 
“insofar as [theology] understands itself to be a science” (PT 53)—that is, a positive, ontic 
science with a specialized realm like all other positive sciences—does theology decide to use 
philosophy as its ontological corrective.21 
 Heidegger now concludes with this formula as a summary of his position: 
Philosophy is the possible, formally indicative ontological corrective of the ontic 
and, in particular, of the pre-Christian content of basic theological concepts. But 
philosophy can be what it is without functioning factically as this corrective 
[emphasis his] (PT 53). 
 
Philosophy is a wholly formal guide, one only concerned with ontologically correcting basic 
ontic concepts in theology, and this concern is one-sided, having to do only with theology’s task 
and not at all with philosophy as such.  
We should note here that, since Heidegger restricts philosophy’s involvement to only 
some basic ontic theological concepts, he is implicitly assuming there to be some ontological 
concepts within theology—or at least within Christian faith, which would then still be part of 
theology’s subject matter. This hint is somewhat clearer in his earlier mention of the “ontological 







understandable, once we see Heidegger’s position that the philosopher, at least in the role of a 
philosopher, should shun any role in this discussion. 
 The “peculiar relationship” between philosophy and theology, Heidegger here asserts the 
most forcefully in the entire text, “includes the fact that faith, as a specific possibility of 
existence, is in its innermost core the mortal enemy of the form of existence that is an essential 
part of philosophy and that is factically ever-changing” [emphasis his] (PT 53). That is, Christian 
faith, as rebirth of Dasein’s existence which is theology’s positive object of study, is a ‘mortal 
enemy’ of the pre-Christian Dasein’s form of existence, which the Christian Dasein calls the 
state of sinfulness. And this state of sinfulness is precisely the object of philosophy’s—and 
specifically Heidegger’s—existential analytic. This is an “existentiell opposition” (PT 53) 
between faithfulness and the practice of philosophy, one which is not simply a fight between 
theology and philosophy but rather primordially between Christian faith as a whole and the 
practice of philosophy. And this opposition is so dire that “philosophy does not even begin to 
want in any way to do battle with [faith]” (PT 53).  
 However, at this point we should also note that, if we keep to our reversal earlier of 
Christian existence as a new existential rather than existentiell re-birth, then the opposition 
between Christian and pre-Christian Dasein would be an existential rather than existentiell 
opposition. The opposition is not between the beings as beings (their ontic nature) but instead 
concerning how these beings exist as human beings. If we remain with my reversal, then the 
opposition between theology and philosophy is better classified as perhaps the most fundamental 




Here we see why Heidegger the philosopher does not comment much at all on any 
ontological notions in Christian faith: by keeping rigorously to its non-revelatory dimensions, 
philosophy finds existence in faith so absolutely foreign—indeed, combative—that it cannot 
speak on it. And so Heidegger, insofar as he is speaking from the perspective of a philosopher, 
cannot speak to the ontological concepts within faith or theology. At best he can only respond 
fixedly from the standpoint of pre-Christian Dasein. It is thus up to theologians to discuss any 
ontological structures within faithful existence; but, let us ask briefly, how can the theologian 
discuss these ontological structures, if he is by Heidegger’s own classification a positive, ontic 
scientist? 
 Only from this fixed opposition between faith and philosophy can there be any fruitful 
relationship between philosophy and theology. Heidegger exhorts both the theologian and the 
philosopher to free themselves from “illusions and weak attempts at mediation” between the two 
(PT 53), and instead assert themselves as opponents. Once they arrive at these combative 
positions, the two actually find a “possibility of a community of the sciences” and come “to 
communicate in a genuine way” [emphasis his] (PT 53). Theology via revelation actually has 
something new to announce to the natural Dasein in philosophy, and philosophy via restriction to 
the natural man reminds theology of its revelatory and miraculous—and therefore impossible—
nature. But this genuine community must, for Heidegger, exclude muddling between them: 
“there is no such thing as a Christian philosophy; that is an absolute ‘square circle’” (PT 53). 
Here Heidegger finally comes out against the possibility mentioned earlier of a philosophy 
driven by the directive of faith. Heidegger now seems to allow only an anti-philosophical 
theology as a proper practice for the Christian. Likewise, the philosopher cannot conceive of a 
“neo-Kantian, or axiological, or phenomenological theology…” (PT 53). Since theology is 
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grounded in revelation given only by faith and is not at all accessible to the natural Dasein, 
philosophy has not even the slightest ability to speak theologically of the divine.22  
Heidegger also makes sure to add that ‘phenomenological’ especially cannot apply to 
theology,23 much in the same way it cannot apply to mathematics (PT 53). That term can only 
refer to the method of ontology, “a procedure that essentially distinguishes itself from that of all 
the other, positive sciences” (PT 53). Heidegger does not accept the possibility of a 
phenomenological method in any other science besides first philosophy, ontology—whether it be 
a directly derived ontic science like mathematics or an indirect and combative one such as 
theology. 
Heidegger concedes that, of course, one may “master” phenomenology “in addition to his 
own positive science,” or at least make himself familiar with “its steps and investigations” (PT 
53). However, the way he presents the tension between the Christian faith and the philosophical 
perspective of ‘free Dasein’ hints at a difficulty for Christians to be able to actually do 
phenomenology. How could the Christian place himself as a free-thinking, pre-Christian Dasein 
in order to properly follow the phenomenological method, without thereby ridding himself of his 
















he may follow any other human enterprise, but can he truly involve himself with it beyond the 
combative role Heidegger’s formula has given him?  
But even without the specific problem philosophy presents to theology and vice versa, 
philosophy can only aid any positive science in a restricted way: 
Philosophical knowledge can become genuinely relevant and fertile for his own 
positive science only when… he comes upon the basic concepts of his science 
and, furthermore, questions the suitability of traditional fundamental concepts 
with respect to those beings that are the theme of his science (PT 53). 
 
The ontic scientist comes to philosophy only when he finds the “basic concepts” in his own 
science to be no longer sufficient to properly analyze the positum of his investigation. In this 
case, the scientist looks further into the ontological grounding of these ontic concepts and judges 
whether he is using the proper ontology to ground them. He “can search back for the original 
ontological constitution of those beings,” clarify or change this grounding ontology, and then 
either renew the basic ontic concepts of his science into a more ontologically correct manner or 
create new ontic concepts entirely (PT 54). Any relation between philosophy and a positive 
science is essentially a questioning and reevaluation of the positive science’s foundation. 
 In the last few sentences of his lecture, Heidegger shirks from demanding that this 
restriction be absolute: “scientific communication… cannot be tied down to definite rules…” 
especially since the concepts of both philosophy and the positive sciences change so often as to 
make an orderly, systematic clarity of these concepts impossible (PT 54). However, he still 
implores scientists in both fields to guide their discussions by “an instinct for the issues and by 
the certainty of scientific good sense,” which he no doubt means the ontological distinction 






primordial foundation of ontology for all other ontic sciences (PT 54). Finally, he exhorts 
philosophers and theologians involved to allow “all the questions about dominance, preeminence 
and validity of the sciences” to “recede behind” the practices and objects of the sciences 
themselves (PT 54).  
 In regard to philosophy and theology, Heidegger most likely has in mind the “questions 
about dominance, preeminence and validity” theology had been chasing since the beginning of 
the modern era: is theology a true science at all, let alone the queen of the sciences it previously 
was in the Middle Ages, and what ‘true’ knowledge can theology find, when its subject matter is 
revelatory faith? This discussion famously climaxed with Kant’s critique of true metaphysical 
knowledge—‘restricting knowledge to make room for faith’—in the 18th century, to which the 
theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher had given the fullest response in the early 19th century, 
which remained until Heidegger’s contemporary, Karl Barth, arrived in the 20th.  
 Heidegger and Barth shared a distaste toward one another’s personal convictions and 
scholarship. Barth once wrote to Bultmann “that he regarded his adherence to Heidegger as a 
‘return to the slave house of Egypt’.”25 For his part, Heidegger wrote to Bultmann in 1932 that 
he  
found Barth’s forward to the newly published second edition to Church 
Dogmatics I so vainglorious that he had no desire to read the book itself, and there 
is no evidence that he engaged with any part of Barth’s magnum opus.26  
 
But they also, oddly enough, seemed to share the attitude that theology should simply be content 
to do its work, rather than justify its place and prestige among the humanities. Heidegger’s 








similar to Barth’s remarks in Evangelical Theology: An Introduction. In the second chapter of 
this work, Barth states: 
Ever since the fading of its illusory splendor as a leading academic power during 
the Middle Ages, theology has taken too many pains to justify its own existence. 
It has tried too hard, especially since the nineteenth century, to secure for itself at 
least a small but honorable place in the throne room of general science… 
[Theology] will always stand on the firmest ground when it simply acts according 
to the laws of its own being.27  
 
He also remarks harshly on philosophical theology: 
 
If ever there was a pure fantasy, really ‘too beautiful to be true,’ it would be the 
idea of a philosophical theology or a theological philosophy in which the attempt 
would be to reason ‘theonomously.’ …Theological knowledge, thought, and 
speech cannot become general truths, and general knowledge cannot become 
theological truth.28 
 
Such words would perhaps find a home in Heidegger’s “Phenomenology and Theology” just as 
well as in Barth’s work. For both men agree that theology is determined solely by its own 
domain, the revelatory acts of God in faith, and nothing else. 
 Or so it would seem. While we have seen that Heidegger is careful to stress theology’s 
independent place within the realm of faith distinct from the other sciences, with his priority of 
the ontological over the ontic, and thus the philosophical over the theological, he cannot help but 
create a hierarchy which relegates theology to being ‘led on the leash’ by philosophy in some 
respect. Heidegger clearly asserts that “[e]very ontic interpretation operates on the basis, first and 
for the most part concealed, of an ontology” (PT 50). Every ontic interpretation—and since 
theology is, for Heidegger, an ontic science, it therefore operates from the foundation of a more 
primordial ontology, no matter how much it wishes to break free from that ontology. If theology 







 No doubt the theologians present at this lecture might have been a little confused to hear 
Heidegger conclude with this exhortation to avoid all discussions of hierarchy and priority, since 
Heidegger himself had just spent the previous minutes setting philosophy before theology. Even 
so, we cannot ignore the fact that Heidegger attempts to free theology from the role of a 
secondary philosophy shrouded in pretty Christian language, a role many theologians of his time 
had been pursuing. Instead, he sees in theology an independent enterprise, to the point of offering 
it the role of ‘mortal enemy’ in battle against philosophy. For someone who holds philosophy as 
the most fundamental, primordial questioning of being, that role is a notable (though certainly 
antagonistic) place to put theology. 
Heidegger himself was unsatisfied with the lecture. He wrote to Elizabeth Blochmann 
that the topic he was asked to discuss—how philosophy might be of use to theologians—
perverted his thoughts into an apologetic for Christianity and theology, rather than what he truly 
wanted: a confrontation.29 Part of this may be due to his placing theology as an ontic science, 
rather than a competing ontology, which I will assert is a more fitting classification below. In this 







THE EXISTENTIALITY OF FAITH 
I have already mentioned some critiques of Heidegger’s thoughts throughout our 
exposition of the essay. Specifically, I challenged Heidegger’s idea of Christian re-birth as an 
ontic-existentiell change rather than an ontological-existential one. Rather than marking 
Christian existence as a specific mode of concrete Dasein, it is more fitting to describe it as a 
worlding, existential structure underlying concrete Dasein’s existence in the world. I also noted 
his implicit hierarchy of philosophy over theology, one which endangers his goal to utterly 
separate theology and philosophy from each other. I will now offer a deeper critique and a 
possible solution to these problems in Heidegger’s argument. 
These problems just mentioned are symptoms of Heidegger’s true and most basic 
difficulty, which goes back to his definition of theology itself, as the ‘science of faith.’ If 
theology is a positive science, then the ‘faith’ of which it is a science is, as discussed, its positum, 
its positive object of study. But Heidegger’s definition of faith is so ontological that it hardly 
makes sense to call the science of this faith ontic and positive. This requires either a 
reformulation of theology’s object of study into something more positive—e.g. God, the history 
of Christianity, the Church, the Bible—which would thus set theology back in place as a positive 
science, or an acceptance of Heidegger’s very ontological definition of faith and a re-
categorization of theology as an ontological science side by side with philosophy.  
First, let us discuss Heidegger’s characterization of faith in more detail. He defines faith 
as: the totality of Christian existence. This totality is historical in that it applies to everything 
Christian, from exegesis of Scriptures to Church history and dogma. It is also essentially 
practical and everyday, since, “because [theology] is an interpretation of Christian existence, the 
content” of this interpretation is always “related to Christian occurrence as such” (PT 47). Faith 
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is always the totality of a Christian Dasein. Essentially, faith is existential fidelity to “the 
Crucified,” as Heidegger states, and thus faith is Christian existence and a specifically Christian 
being. As the study of faith, then, theology is the study of Christian being, Christian existence. 
This is no study of an ordinary positum, like the human brain in psychology or a specific culture 
in history. Rather, this is a phenomenological study of a new totality of Dasein’s existence 
brought about by its acceptance of revelation.  
This problem is illustrated best by Heidegger’s description of Christian existence as ‘re-
birth.’ While the ‘re-‘ suggests a positive study built upon the foundation of that more primordial 
birth, the combination of the two into one word, rebirth, creates something entirely different 
from either the original birth and the simple prefix ‘re-.’The sum of the two is greater than its 
parts. And yet, the presence of birth within the new word suggests that it retains the ontological, 
existential, keeping with the original existential analytic required of Dasein but also needing 
either modification or even totally new analysis due to the ‘re-.’ In this manner, Heidegger’s 
definition of faith as rebirth muddles the difference between the ontic and ontological to such an 
extent, indeed with a preference towards the ontological rather than the positive character of 
Christianity, that it challenges his own formula of theology as a positive science. 
This muddling explains the subtleties within “Phenomenology and Theology,” where he 
touches briefly on the ontological realms of Christian faith but never develops them further. One 
pointed example is when Heidegger suggests briefly that “things such as the cross, sin, etc.” 
“manifestly belong to the ontological context of Christianness” [emphasis mine] (PT 50). He 
never develops what this ontological context of Christianness means further—is this context 
simply the way the Christian exists in the world as Dasein? But since this way of being-in-the-
world is a very special case, does it not have its own specific ontological structure? And then 
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would we not then be in an independent ontological investigation, rather than a positive-ontic 
one—that is, in the realm of being? 
Heidegger even goes so far as to state that Dasein’s appropriation of faith, in the relating 
of faithful history (revelation) and faithful occurrence (Christian existence), arises from the 
“possibilities of a faithful existence [Dasein]” (PT 48). ‘Faithful existence’—that is, Christian 
life—possesses its own ‘possibilities’—existential structures—which allow Dasein to 
appropriate revelation. Again, he goes no further into discussion of these structures, but he 
suggests that they do exist, distinct from the primordial existential structures of non-believing 
Dasein. 
He claims this being-in-faith is a positive object of study, but then defines it in terms of 
being, including even existential possibilities. This is the realm of ontology and the 
phenomenological structures therein. Thus by Heidegger’s own definition of faith, theology is 
the science of Christian-being with other beings, be they God, other Christians, the unfaithful, 
the world, etc. Faith cannot be a positum. As defined by Heidegger, it is similar to the being-of-
entities which is the goal of ontology to reveal. And thus theology is, according to his own 
definition of it as the science of faith, an ontology. 
There are two paths to remedy this problem: 1) to reformulate theology’s positum into a 
more positive object, and thus better position theology as a positive science, or 2) to accept faith, 
in its Heideggerian definition, as theology’s area of study and therefore discuss its ontological 
character similar to philosophy. While the first path may be in better keeping with the theological 
and philosophical tradition, I will argue the merits of the second path. 
Some theologians may take the first route. A Catholic Thomist would probably rather 
definition theology in its etymological sense: the science of God. In a similar way the Protestant 
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Barthian may condemn Heidegger’s definition as too anthropocentric. Barth himself prefers 
theology’s study as simply the study of God, but with the added caveat that it is a study of God 
with man.30 In this case, the theologian refers to theology as the study of the Being, Christ or 
God, which does give theology an object of study and makes it a positive science.  
Heidegger himself challenges this classification of theology as the science of God (PT 
48). Theology misunderstands itself when it thinks it concerns its study of God as a positive 
object over which it speculates. It cannot assume a detached role of observer, but can only place 
itself as faithful practice underneath the yoke of its supposed ‘object’ of study. Theology 
concerns being-with-God, not being-with-God. The emphasis here in a proper theology is on the 
subjective participation with God and not the objective nature of God himself. While part of 
theology might discuss the nature of God objectively or theoretically, this discussion is always 
for the purpose of the Christian’s being-with this Being. It is always for the purpose of 
“homiletics and catechetics” (PT 48)—cultivation of faithfulness that puts the Christian Dasein 
in better position to accept its faith. In the words of the mystic poet, Angelus Silesius, “If Christ 
were born in Bethlehem a thousand times and not in thee thyself; then art thou lost eternally.” 
Even a pure appreciation of the objective glory of God is done phenomenologically from the side 
of Dasein. The Christian theologian must always guard against thinking theonomously—as if he 
can think of God as noumatic object rather than as the Lord to his discipleship. Christian 
theology is always done as a Christian, not as a detached scientist and certainly not as God 







the realm of theology, Kierkegaard is right that ‘truth is subjectivity’31—that is, in the sense of 
making oneself a subject and servant before God, as Kierkegaard means it. Thus, we cannot 
escape the fact that theology is a study of Christian being-with, Christianness, Christian 
existence, even in its most objective case of being-with-God. 
We thus see that the theology of faith, as Heidegger defines it and as I have defended 
against its more positive classification, has an ontological character rather than a positive-ontic 
one. It is much closer to philosophy than to biology or mathematics, or even history or 
psychology. The second path is therefore more apt: to pursue the consequences of Heidegger’s 
mistake of defining theology in a too ontological manner and thus draw out the 
phenomenological-ontological character of theology. 
This does not mean that theology is simply another philosophy; the differences between 
the two are still evident, and Heidegger’s own definition shows this. “Theology in its essence has 
the character of a practical science” [emphasis his] (PT 48). That is, theology’s essential work is 
exegesis of scriptures, catechetics for pastors and preachers, and analysis of dogma—and all of 
this is for the purpose of homiletics, a cultivation of faithfulness. Heidegger illustrates this fact 
best by the statement: “Theology is systematic only when it is historical and practical. It is 
historical only when it is practical and systematic. And it is practical only when it is systematic 
and historical” [emphasis his] (PT 48). Theology does not come closer to philosophy by 
becoming like a philosophy, but rather only by becoming more explicitly theological. Heidegger 









the application of some philosophy and its system, the more philosophical is its own radical 
scientific character” [emphasis his] (PT 48).  
So how are theology and philosophy to interact, if theology does best by simply being a 
theology and, likewise, philosophy a philosophy? Their relationship would be an almost 
diametrically opposed one according to Heidegger’s formula, the very ‘mortal enemies’ 
Heidegger characterized but was reluctant to develop further.32 This comes as they are, in 
essence, two competing ontologies. If Christian faith and the study thereof is ontological, then 
philosophy and theology cannot help this difference. The difficulty is that the pre- or non- 
Christian philosophy begins from the orientation of a non-revelatory ‘free-thinking Dasein,’ 
while the Christian theology begins from its founding disclosure of revelation in faith, which 
requires it be ‘re-born’ and reorient its entire existence. It seems that, since they operate from 
these diametrically opposed orientations, there may be little common ground upon which they 
can interact. 
There is also the problem that theology, by the characterization we have discussed, is not 
an apologetic science. It is not meant at all to confront and battle philosophy through ideas and 
concepts. One becomes a Christian by engaging with revelation, not by reading theology. If 
theology attempted to wrest that power away from revelation and assume its own ability to 
convert or engage the world, it would become something less, not more. Theology must be 
simply a practical, catechetical, homiletic science. It does not create faith through the power of 
its ideas but only makes more explicit the faith upon which Dasein relies. Therefore it is not 






‘secular worldview’ of philosophy.33 Even though they may be different or even oppositional 
ontologies, it does not follow that they act in opposition. 
What then of theology and phenomenology/ontology? If they are not to interact as 
competing worldviews, and indeed it seems difficult to imagine a fruitful discussion anyway, 
what is the role of theology in ontology and vice versa? I am unsure what the philosopher may 
think of theology or its uses, but for my part I can speak to a need in theology regarding ontology 
and phenomenology, which may provide a path forward for theologians in their thinking 










THE ONTOLOGICAL-DETERMINITIVE CHARACTER OF THE CROSS 
For our discussion of the need of a specifically Christian ontology, I will take Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer’s statement in Act and Being, his dissertation which engages explicitly with 
Heidegger’s phenomenology, as our guide: “With the knowledge, gained in revelation, that 
finitude is creatureliness—that is, open for God34—all concepts of being must be formed 
anew.”35 That is, due to the event of revelation which brings about the realization that man is 
before God and God is before man, this requires a completely new formal analysis of being. 
Indeed, Bonhoeffer’s critique of Heideggerian phenomenology and its relationship to Protestant 
theology is exactly where we find a demand for theology’s role in an existential analytic of 
Dasein. 
The most basic issue which requires a specifically Christian existential analytic is that of 
revelation. I define revelation here as an essentially impossible event that arises out of God’s free 
act and not from any natural or human capabilities. Heidegger agrees roughly with this definition 
in his lecture. For he states that the “essence” of faith does not arise “from Dasein or 
spontaneously through Dasein, but rather from that which is revealed…” (PT 43-44). That is, the 
















without. Since revelation can only come from without, it can only be believed according to 
testimony of existence (PT 43), or proclamation of revelation in existence, which is faith. 
In Heidegger’s phenomenology, as he mentions briefly in this lecture, every 
interpretation of existence, whether ontic-scientific or everyday, “operates on the basis, at first 
and for the most part concealed, of an ontology” (PT 50). Dasein always exists with a pre-
conceptual understanding of being, no matter how concealed. This is what makes the 
investigation into being possible in the first place—if there was no primordial understanding of 
being hidden within Dasein’s capabilities, then we could not ever hope to find it.36 Therefore all 
fundamental existential structures already exist in Dasein, and any event of being happens within 
the boundaries of these existential structures. Being happens as a possibility only within Dasein’s 
existentiality. As Bonhoeffer interprets it, Dasein is “the window on being” (AB 72). 
How does this regard revelation? Because Heidegger ties the understanding of being so 
intrinsically to Dasein’s capabilities, the concept of being “remains self-contained” (AB 72). 
Heidegger’s phenomenology is avowedly a-theistic: any event of revelation would have to ‘flash 
within the realm of being,’ and any encounter with God or the divine would have to happen 
within Dasein’s possibilities to-be in its existential structures, especially that of temporality. 
Bonhoeffer calls this result an “atheistic philosophy” of “closed-in finitude” (AB 72). 
As a result, revelation in Heidegger’s phenomenology cannot happen as revelation. Any 
event of being is essentially closed in by Dasein’s existential structures. Revelation, according to 
its own definition, is an im-possibility. While it nevertheless does ‘flash within the realm of 
being’—and in that sense it does happen as a ‘possibility’—it happens as an event that, 






call it an ‘im-possibility.’ Revelation does not come from within Dasein’s possibilities but only 
from without. But if all being is reduced to Dasein’s possibility to-be, then even the most 
miraculous revelation would be reduced to Dasein’s possibility, simply because of the fact that it 
happens in the realm of being. In this way revelation is reduced to Dasein; God’s act is reduced 
to Dasein’s possibility.  
If a Christian theology wants to accord revelation its due place, it must accept 
revelation’s “essential character of an event, one that comes from God’s freedom” (AB 78). But 
if revelation only happens as a possibility within Dasein’s existential structures, it no longer 
comes from without as an act of ‘God’s freedom’ and therefore is not revelation. Here we arrive 
at the theologian’s conundrum: if he wants to engage with Heidegger, he must either reject 
revelation’s status as revelation or reject Heidegger’s framework of closed-in finitude. 
We have already discussed Heidegger’s formulation of re-birth. Christian faith is re-birth 
(PT 51). In re-birth Dasein is “placed before God” and, due to this, “existence is reoriented in 
and through the mercy of God grasped in faith” (PT 44). In that manner, re-birth is ontological-
existential—not existentiell, as we have argued already—in that it brings about Dasein’s 
reorientation of the totality of all Christian existence. But this reorientation comes only through 
faith, and faith only comes through revelation, and this revelation is “Christ, the crucified God” 
(PT 44). But the crucifixion “is a historical event…” [emphasis mine] (PT 44). The crucifixion of 
Christ is existentiell as this concrete life situation which happened in history. But it is also an 
event which, as the death of God, goes beyond the account which Dasein’s possibilities can give. 
The crucifixion breaks into history from without; it is an event in the truest sense, as the very 
irruption of history. Christian re-birth, which is an existential reorientation, is given only on the 
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foundation of the existentiell event of the crucifixion.37 The existential reorientation, founded 
upon the existentiell event, then further leads to existentiell, concrete existence—the Christian 
life. Here Bonhoeffer rightly notes that in “revelation, the ontic-existentiell and ontological-
existential structures coincide” (AB 78). Christian existence, because it is based on a revelatory, 
existentiell event, receives direction from this event rather than constitutive existential 
possibilities of Dasein. In this way revelation “supersedes and challenges also the existential-
ontological possibilities of Dasein” (AB 78). Here “revelation claims to be the initiator of the 
unity of Dasein and have the sole right to do so” [emphasis mine] (AB 78). What has been 
implicit in our analysis of Christian existence now becomes explicit: revelation and faith, not 
Dasein’s primordial-fundamental ontological constitution, directs and constitutes the unity of 
Christian existence. Where Heidegger claims that in every instance Dasein already has a 
fundamental understanding and unity of being hidden within itself, Christianity asserts that this 
unity absolutely does not lie within its own capabilities, but rather comes from without and then 
directs all Dasein’s existence. Not even the “existential structure of Dasein” acts as “second 
mediator” between the Christian and his experience of revelation (AB 78). At this point “the 
deepest root of philosophy, the one from which it derives its claims, is cut” (AB 78). 
Fundamental ontology, even one so originally and impressively constitutive of pre-Christian 
Dasein as Heidegger’s phenomenology, cannot suffice as a proper existential analysis of 
Christian Dasein. Instead, an existential analytic from the basis of revelation—specifically the 









This calls for a totally new Christian concept of being. Whatever similarities these 
concepts share with philosophical language are nevertheless wholly unique, as they are directed 
by the crucified God through revelation in faith to Christian Dasein and received in faith and 
perpetuated further in faith through the study of theology. Christian faith, due to its founding 
disclosure of revelation which claims all existence and the existential structures therein, is 
ontological, determinative of all of Christian existence. 
By grounding all Christian ontic concepts in the foundation of pre-Christian ontological 
concepts, Heidegger sets theology as positively dependent on philosophy. However, as we have 
shown, by Heidegger’s own assumption of faith as the totality of Christian existence, theology 
and its theological concepts are not merely ontic but instead ontological, and therefore cannot be 
merely dependent on pre-Christian ontological notions. This requires, as Bonhoeffer states, that 
‘all concepts of being must be formed anew.’ Therefore theology has a responsibility within its 
own systematic praxis to provide an existential analytic of being. 
Here, however, the utmost precision is required. For it seems that theology, because of its 
avowed dependence on Christ for direction of all existential structures, now enters into the realm 
of neo-Thomist ontology, which begins its ontology from the summum ens (God) and then 
relates being and beings to it via the analogia entis. Man is in becoming, and God in being. 
Therefore man can relate to God as becoming to being. “The relation between God and human 
beings takes the form neither of pure exclusivity… nor of pure identity… both wholes can be 
considered, rather, in a relation of ‘likeness’ to one another, as being is like becoming” (AB 73). 
Within this system, both philosophizing and theologizing—the difference between them never 
becomes clear—begin from the starting point of God as prima causa and then related to man in 
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analogy. This is what we will call roughly the ‘scholastic’ tradition, which has had contributions 
from both Protestants and Catholics.  
But this framework cannot suffice as answer to Bonhoeffer’s claim for a specifically 
Christian ontology. The first reason is that the scholastic tradition begins from God as the prima 
causa and summum ens—that is, from a philosophical premise of creation, whereas Bonhoeffer 
requires an ontology beginning explicitly from the Christ event, the crucifixion.38 A second 
reason is that such an ontology opens itself to the effective critiques of onto-theology Heidegger 
has already famously given. The third, most radical reason is that, as Barth has already so 
forcefully polemicized throughout all his work, the scholastic tradition sees a continuity between 
God and man in the realm of being and reason. ‘The natural light of reason,’ which guides 
theological and ontological investigation, bridges the gap between God and Dasein. As standing 
in becoming but also in relation to being, Dasein “must already bear within themselves, as a 
possibility of existence, the possibility of beholding the ‘is’” (AB 75)—that is, God. Dasein has 
access to God in its own capabilities. Though man is fallen and needs divine grace to achieve 
access to God, he still has an original capability to do so. The essence of revelation—the 
complete miracle outside of man’s existential capabilities—is cheapened. Here again, while 
coming from the opposite direction, “human existence is, once again, comprehensible through 
itself and also has access to God” (AB 75); in effect, the same result of Heidegger’s 
phenomenology. While in the former case of Heideggerian phenomenology man comes to being 










true being. While the first case is auto-nomous in that it bases all knowledge on Dasein’s 
inherent (though concealed) understanding, the second is theo-nomous in that it bases all 
knowledge on God’s own understanding of being as derived from human capacity to behold the 
esse. Both are illusory: for man is not alone with himself with being enclosed in his 
understanding—contra Heidegger—but even less is man capable of understanding God as a 
continuity between his becoming and God’s being—contra Aquinas.  
What is needed instead is a hetero-nomous ontology, an ontologia crucis. By this I mean 
a theological account of being in which Dasein encounters the divine—specifically in revelation 
of the cross in faith—and lets all ontological investigation be led by this revelation, all while still 
remaining as Dasein and not attempting to ‘think God’s thoughts after Him,’ in keeping with the 
respect of absolute ontological difference between God and man. This ontology will refrain from 
founding its investigations on an account of the summum ens and then deriving all concepts of 
Dasein’s being from the absolute being of God. Instead it will accept its account of being as 
coming wholly from the side of Dasein rather than from God. In this way, this heteronomous 
ontology will resemble phenomenology more than scholastic ontology. It will be 
phenomenological in the sense that it can only encounter beings as Dasein encountering beings. 
In agreeing with Heidegger, it recognizes that Dasein is the only being for which being can be an 
issue as investigated by Dasein. This ontology will be decisively existential. But it will also 
resemble scholastic ontology more than phenomenology in that it founds its investigations on 
revelation of God rather than the free-standing Dasein. It would allow the revelation of the cross 




 Because it would found all ontological investigation on the event of the crucifixion, it 
would serve as an explicitly evangelical ontology—by ‘evangelical’ we mean the original term 
in the New Testament, euangelion, the ‘pronouncement’ of Christ. It would differ from 
scholastic ontology in the same way that Luther differentiates the theologia glorae and the 
theologia crucis in his Heidelberg Disputations: 
That person does not deserve to be called a theologian who looks upon the 
invisible things of God as though they were clearly perceptible in those things 
which have actually happened (Rom. 1:20; cf. 1 Cor 1:21-25), he deserves to be 
called a theologian, however, who comprehends the visible and manifest things of 
God seen through suffering and the cross… A theology of glory calls evil good 
and good evil. A theology of the cross calls the thing what it actually is.39 
 
Whereas scholastic ontology, via Greek metaphysics, calls ‘the thing’ according to metaphysical 
assignment derived from the thought of Aristotle, evangelical ontology would call ‘the thing 
what it actually is’—as that which is ‘seen through suffering and the cross,’ as existence marked 
by the crucifixion event. Evangelical ontology, like the evangelical theology which is a theologia 
crucis, would be an ontologia crucis. 
How would such an ontology relate to phenomenology? Luther’s remark, the 
implications of which still has yet to appreciated, may provide answer: ‘a theology of the cross 
calls the thing what it actually is.’ Any theology of the cross, far from being secluded in a closed, 
non-ontological system, ‘calls the thing what it actually is.’ It engages with things as under the 
shadow of cross, claiming this as their true ontological nature rather than what simply appears 
before us. Phenomenology, the discourse of letting the thing show itself in its own self-showing, 
																																																								







has a similar aim—that is, to properly find the name of the thing and to engage with beings 
properly according to their truth. While the differences could be vast (and I have no doubt they 
are), both Heidegger’s phenomenology and an evangelical ontology work in the same realm of 
proper engagement with beings—the realm of being. Both are, again, decidedly existential. 
It should be noted that the theological claim of an ontologia crucis, while merited on the 
side of theology, has no strictly formal merits on the side of philosophy. The only answer an a-
theistic ontologist can give to Bonhoeffer’s claim is, in turn, a demand that the Christian actually 
present this ontology which he is claiming only the Christian can give. The claim of an 
independent Christian ontology (specifically in our case an ontologia crucis) rests entirely on 
such an ontology actually existing.  
It is unclear whether this ontology would formulate completely new existential 
categories, or if it would add existential categories to the already-existing ones Heidegger has 
given, or some combination of the two, with revision of Heidegger’s categories in light of 
revelation but still keeping his starting points in place. There is evidence of support in 
Bonhoeffer and others for any of those routes. But such determination can only happen, again, in 
the actual theological-ontological investigation. 
A full construction and analysis of such an ontology is far too large a project for this 
thesis. However, I have provided grounds why a Christian theologian—due to the somewhat 
problematic but still fruitful formulation of theology as the science of Christian faith as presented 
by Heidegger, as well as his own commitments to revelation as revelation, which restricts 
theology from founding its inquiry on a strictly a-theistic phenomenological ontology—must 
commit to searching for and explicating an ontologia crucis. If theology wishes to truly engage 
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with Heidegger as theology, in keeping with its own rigorous independence—but still with an 
interest in the analysis of being—then this path is what it must take.  
The stakes are high, since the success of the theological critique of Heidegger depends on 
theology actually producing its own phenomenological ontology and uncovering further 
existential structures unique to Christian faith. A critique from the side of revelation can only 
succeed if that revelation actually has something to say. But this path is also an exciting prospect 
for the future, as it places ontological investigation between the strictly phenomenological and 
the strictly theological, and it defies the strict separation between these two while still doing best 
to hold to each science’s rigorous methods and distinctions. 
To borrow one of Heidegger’s idioms, I hope to have cut an opening into a section of the 
forest which calls for a new path to be cut and explored. We stand at the edge, not yet cut into 
the forest—but we do stand at the edge, with opportunity to meet fellow pathfinders, re-discover 
old paths carved by thinkers before but which have become overgrown,40 and finally the chance 





















EPILOGUE: A PATH FORWARD IN THE APPENDIX 
 Heidegger added to this lecture a much later letter, which was delivered in 1964 to a 
group of theologians discussing “The Problem of a Nonobjectifying Thinking and Speaking in 
Today’s Theology” at Drew University in New Jersey (PT 39). Heidegger himself did not attend 
the discussion.41 He then combined these two pieces, publishing them together in Archives de 
Philosophie in 1969 with the addition of a French translation (PT 39). 
By this time, Heidegger was already well into his so-called age of obscurity, as he had 
been questioning the ability of philosophy and ontology to think since at least 1941.42 This 
context will clarify his statement in the preface, written in 1970:  
This little book might perhaps be able to occasion repeated reflection on the 
extent to which the Christianness of Christianity and its theology merit 
questioning; but also on the extent to which philosophy, in particular that 
presented here, merits questioning (PT 39). 
 
It is clear even from this somewhat vague statement that the later Heidegger is not interested in a 
polemic against Christianity, nor does he doggedly assume philosophy’s superiority over 
theology as the ontological over the ontic. Rather, he suggests, just as philosophy offers 
‘repeated reflection’ on the merits or lack thereof in Christianity, so too does Christianity offer a 

















 With this in mind, we will have a better grasp of Heidegger’s tone throughout this letter. 
He no longer aims to clearly set boundaries or close off discussion, but he instead suggests 
opening up thinking about the divine to ways which go beyond the scientifically objective 
method of study. We will find that his antagonism is now focused on what I will call the 
scientistic way of viewing the world, and in this letter he will come to theology’s defense against 
this scientism’s attack. 
The subject of this letter and its surrounding conference is the issue of nonobjectifying 
language in theology. Is it possible to think scientifically and theologically about God and 
Christian revelation without thinking of God or revelation as object and ourselves as thinking 
subjects? And even beyond this, is it possible to think about anything at all without objectifying 
it as an object and holding ourselves as detached, thinking subjects over and against them? 
Heidegger begins the lecture by stating what he calls three major ‘themes’ to this 
question, around which he will then frame the discussion. 
The first theme: “Above all else one must determine what theology, as a mode of 
thinking and speaking, is to place in discussion” (PT 54). This question is essentially the same 
one with which Heidegger began the 1927 lecture. That is, what does theology study? or, to use 
Heidegger’s earlier language, what is theology’s positum, or object of study? But here Heidegger 
no longer uses such language. Rather than assuming theology has a positive object of study, 
discerning which positive object this is, and then arguing for such an object, Heidegger goes 
further back and simply asks: what does theology, ‘as a mode of thinking and speaking,’ discuss?  
Heidegger does keep the same answer to this question as before, “the Christian faith, and 
what is believed therein” (PT 54). But not once does he assert that this is theology’s positum or 
object of study. Still, keeping “the Christian faith” as theology’s sole responsibility is made no 
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less essential. Heidegger states that “[o]nly if this is kept clearly in view” can the practice of 
“thinking and speaking” in theology produce any true theological speaking (PT 54). If theology 
resorts to an object of study such as history or psychology of religion, then it will return to a 
derivative form of these other sciences. But if the Christian faith is ‘kept clearly in view,’ then 
theological thinking and speaking will both successfully answer the “proper sense and claim of 
faith” and also “avoid projecting into faith ideas that are alien to it” (PT 54).  
This is two-fold in a positive and negative sense: theology positively frames its discussion 
and builds original concepts in thinking and speaking about the ‘claim of faith,’ and it negatively 
removes all the ‘alien’ concepts creeping in from the other sciences or the surrounding culture. 
And in this positive and negative action theology stakes its place. 
The first theme concerns only theology, but the second refers to all thinking in general: 
Prior to a discussion of nonobjectifying thinking and speaking, it is ineluctable 
that one state what is intended by objectifying thinking and speaking. Here the 
question arises whether or not all thinking and speaking are objectifying by their 
very nature [emphasis his] (PT 54). 
 
Even before we can discuss a nonobjectifying theological thinking, or even a nonobjectifying 
thinking, we must first question whether such thinking is desired, or even possible.  
Heidegger must answer to Hans Jonas’ critique made at the conference: that “the subject-
object relation… is not a lapse but the privilege, burden, and duty of man. Not Plato is 
responsible for it but the human condition.”43 Jonas holds that objectification is essential to 
man’s nature, not some barrier to be overcome so as to return to a better, more primal state. He 






Bible… in Moses no less than Plato” [emphasis his]44—i.e., through the idea of “createdness,”  
biblical revelation itself assumes man’s relationship with the world as one between subjects and 
objects. And so any biblical theologian should deplore an attempt made by a mystical 
philosopher to close this rift or normalize language as object-less. Heidegger must counter this 
point, or else his whole project to escape from objectifying or scientific language will fail—or at 
least fail to be of use to theologians. 
 If Heidegger can successfully address this second theme, then he can come to the third, 
which is the theological summation of the two prior themes:  
One must decide to what extent the problem of a nonobjectifying thinking and speaking 
is a genuine problem at all, whether one is not inquiring here about something in such a 
way that only circumvents the matter, diverts from the theme of theology and 
unnecessarily confounds it (PT 55). 
 
We must decide whether the “problem of a nonobjectifying thinking and speaking” actually 
concerns theology, and especially whether the attack that theology is not sufficiently objective is 
of genuine concern to theology at all. If such an attack is not as problematic as the second 
question suggests—that is, if we may clearly find that there are other ways of thinking besides 
scientific objectification—then theology might best avoid even discussing it, since it only 
‘diverts from the theme of theology’ and opens it up to a discussion which ‘unnecessarily’ causes 
theology trouble. At the end of this theme, theology would seem to find that “it was on a path 
leading nowhere with its problem” (PT 55), and the best thing the theologian could do is simply 
return to his work. 
 Even so, a discussion of the third theme offers an apology of sorts for the practice of 
theology, a defense from the attack of the natural sciences. But the importance of this theme goes 





negative-critical task of removing alien and borrowed concepts from its discourse. In this case, if 
we come to realize that the objectifying way of thinking and speaking is foreign to faith’s own 
language—quite contrary to Jonas’ claim—then this calls for theology’s ‘major task’ to rid itself 
of objectifying thought—no small enterprise, since that would call for a critical revision of most 
previous theologies since the influence of the Greeks, and certainly a very critical assessment of 
most modernist theologies. In this way theology realizes its goal “to think and speak out of faith 
for faith with fidelity to its subject matter” (PT 55). Heidegger suggests that, if theology is truly 
successful,45 then it will “by the power of its own conviction” speak to “the human being as 
human being in his very nature…” (PT 55). Theology will have no need of borrowed “categories 
of…thinking” (PT 55), least of all the subject-object relation, and simply speak to the ‘human 
being as human being.’ 
Heidegger, as a philosopher, can “give some pointers only with regard to the second 
topic” (PT 55). The question concerning the possibility of nonobjectifying speaking and thinking 
can be met by anyone, and is a key question for philosophy, the ‘science of thinking.’ However, 
only theology can answer the first and the third questions; whether theology should care about 
nonobjectifying thought is totally up to whether this method of thinking sufficiently approaches 
the Christian revelation and faith which directs all of theology’s matter of thinking. And since 
this faith is only accessible to the theologian, no other scientist can answer that question for 
them. 
Now that he has set the three themes for discussion, he focuses the rest of the letter on 






it actually possible to have any thinking at all besides the objective? These pointers, however, are 
only in the form of some questions, to which Heidegger offers basic answers. 
This theme requires the most basic question: 
Is objectifying thinking and speaking a particular kind of thinking and speaking, 
or does all thinking as thinking, all speaking as speaking, necessarily have to be 
objectifying? (PT 55) 
 
At stake in this question is nothing less than Heidegger’s life work. Ever since the publication of 
Being and Time, Heidegger had been battling against what he sees as the inherently nihilistic 
method of metaphysics which classifies beings as objects and, lying behind their objectivity, 
‘nothing more.’ But if all thinking and speaking is by its nature necessarily objectifying—as in, a 
placing of beings over and against us as measurable appearances—then metaphysics is correct, 
and Heidegger’s work is only concerned with the ‘nothing more’ lying behind all objects. 
 But before broadly addressing this question, Heidegger poses another set of more specific 
questions: 
a) What does objectifying mean? 
b) What does thinking mean? 
c) What does speaking mean? 
d) Is all thinking in itself a speaking, and all speaking in itself a thinking? 
e) In what sense are speaking and thinking objectifying, and in what sense are 
they not? (PT 56) 
 
All these questions “interpenetrate” when set into discussion with each other (PT 56). Combined 
together, they are the heart of the problem of nonobjectifying thought in both theology and 
philosophy. And the essence of the answers to these questions is the foundational decision over 
what place language has in human existence, as Heidegger argues according to the most popular 
positions on language. 
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The two most extreme positions concerning this problem are the “technical-scientistic 
view of language,”46 represented by Rudolf Carnap, and the “speculative-hermeneutic experience 
of language,”47 represented by Heidegger (PT 56). The scientistic view sees thinking and 
speaking as a “sign-system that can be constructed logically or technically…as an instrument of 
science” (PT 56). Heidegger holds that such a view “desires to subjugate” and “secure” language 
as this instrument (PT 56)—a critique wholly typical of the later Heidegger’s concern with the 
modern technological age. The second position, Heidegger’s hermeneutical view, instead arises 
out of the question: “what is it that is to be experienced as the proper matter of philosophical 
thinking, and how is this matter (being as being) to be said?” (PT 56). Contrary to the first, 
which restricts language to that of a constructed sign-system defined by the parameters of use for 
scientific work, the hermeneutical method simply asks what it means to be as a being, and how 
this being is to speak and think philosophically. 
Both these positions agree in that their philosophy of language is not simply one realm 
among others, like a philosophy of art or nature, etc. (PT 56). Instead, both agree that language is 
“the realm within which the thinking of philosophy and every kind of thinking and saying” 
happen (PT 56). The hermeneutical and the scientistic do not simply have philosophies of 
language, but instead hold that all philosophy and thought as philosophy and thought are 
philosophies of language. The Western tradition has recognized that man is man insofar as he is 
the “living being that ‘has language’” (PT 56)—that is, what makes man human is language 
itself. Therefore, the opposition between the scientistic and the hermeneutical is a debate 







the stakes here beyond the question of nonobjectifying thought, elevating this debate on language 
to a debate over human existence itself. 
One would assume Heidegger suggests that theology land on his side of the debate, but 
again he refrains from immediately prescribing theology’s place within this discussion. He 
instead leaves it “up to theology to decide in what manner and to what extent it can and should 
enter into this debate” (PT 56). While he is now willing to break silence and explicitly address 
theologians again, he is not willing to speak for the theologian himself. Here we see that the later 
Heidegger still respects the boundaries between theology and philosophy he had set those years 
ago in the lecture. 
Now that the debate between the two main poles of hermeneutical and scientistic has 
been set, Heidegger will move on to discuss the questions (a) to (e) in more detail. But before 
going into more discussion, he prefaces with an “observation” of the “widespread, uncritically 
accepted opinion that all thinking as representing, and all speaking as vocalization, are already 
‘objectifying’” (PT 56). This is the assumption made by Jonas, that “[n]ot Plato is responsible for 
[objectification] but the human condition, its limits and nobility under the order of creation. ”48 
Heidegger does not go into detail of this assumption’s history,49 but he makes sure to note the 
“determining factor” in this assumption that all thinking and speaking are objectifying “has been 
the distinction, set forth in an unclarified manner long ago, between the rational and the 
irrational” (PT 56-57).  
Surely this distinction has affected theology tremendously. Since antiquity there has been 








usually running along the lines of cataphatic (positive) versus apophatic (negative) theology, 
where the former makes positive assertions about the characteristics and works of God, while the 
latter arrives at a knowledge of God through a negation of all other positive attributes. And while 
at times the divide has been bridged through the works of some thinkers like Anselm, Aquinas, 
Kierkegaard or Barth,50 the stereotype separating rational theology from irrational mysticism had 
continued into the 20th century.51 
This distinction has two consequences for theology: first, it assumes that ‘irrational’ 
theology is not sufficiently rational and in fact shuns all use of reason for the sake of vacuous 
spirituality; and second, it assumes that ‘rational’ theology is not sufficiently spiritual, that it 
shuns devotion for the sake of comfort within the bounds of reason. The rational theologian then 
leaves all spirituality to the mystic, fearful that it may be sentimental, romantic, or heterodox, 
and the mystic leaves any deliberative reason to the rational theologian, assuming academic rigor 
is inimical to any true encounter with the divine. 
While this distinction may or may not be unwarranted, nevertheless it “is brought to bear 
in the jurisdiction of a reasonable but itself unclarified manner of thinking” (PT 57)—in the 










51	Heidegger himself always showed a preference to apophatic theology, as he often referred to 




The overall assumption that all thinking and speaking are objectifying has come to 
climax, Heidegger argues here and elsewhere,52 in the recent “teachings of Nietzsche, Bergson, 
and the life-philosophers…” (PT 57). These thinkers claim that, whenever we say ‘is,’ which “in 
modern times has been interpreted as objectivity” and thus as a solid state, we attempt to solidify 
the “intrinsic flow of the ‘life-stream’” that is really only a continuous flow of existence without 
permanence or actual presence (PT 57). This “solidifying of the intrinsic flow,” as an attempt to 
re-present as eternal that which is merely temporal, is “thus a falsifying thereof” (PT 57). And 
thus all metaphysics, or attempts to represent life objectively, are falsifications. However, even 
though it falsifies, it “is indispensible for the preservation and continuance of human life” (PT 
57). Men cannot escape the necessity of re-presenting their experiences as permanent objects; 
such is required to have any thought at all. Heidegger quotes the following passage from 
Nietzsche’s “Will to Power, no. 715 (1887/1888)” as illustration for this claim: “The means of 
expression in language cannot be used to express ‘becoming’; to posit continually a more crude 
world of what is permanent, of things, etc. is part of our irredeemable need for preservation” 
[emphasis his] (PT 57). 
Here in Nietzsche we find a more radical version of Jonas’ stance at the conference: that 
objectification is the ‘privilege, burden, and duty of man.’ But now the truth of man’s ‘burden’ 
has come to the fore, since metaphysics realizes that all its attempts at re-presentation and 
objectification are inherently false, no matter how necessary. Philosophy then is at a moment of 
crisis, where it must either accept the fate of necessary falsehoods, or attempt the seemingly 
impossible task of moving to a manner of thinking beyond re-presentation. In giving some 






We should note that in the first edition (1970) of this appendix, Heidegger mentions that 
these “pointers deliberately leave the ontological difference unheeded” (PT 57). If Heidegger 
were to ignore the ontological difference in this text, it would have huge ramifications for the 
relationship between philosophy and theology. For their relationship is built on the basis of the 
difference between the one ontological science, philosophy, and the ontic science, theology. The 
difference is Heidegger’s driving thesis in the original lecture! While the above phrase was 
removed from later editions, we cannot ignore that Heidegger is at least considering a revision of 
his earlier work. The boundary between philosophy and theology, now compromised by 
Heidegger’s initial disregard for the ontological difference, is less clear than it was before. 
Heidegger makes one last point before discussing the questions (a) through (e). 
Throughout thinking these questions we should emphasize the “mystery of language” as “not a 
work of human beings: language speaks” (PT 57). Far from being a proclamation of some 
“fantastical ‘mysticism,’” he argues that it is instead a recognition that language is a “primal 
phenomenon” which can only be properly grasped in an “unprejudiced experience of language” 
(PT 57). Humans cannot simply tame and secure language as a technical instrument for scientific 
use, as the scientists think we do. Rather, the securing of language as a sign system only happens 
“in reference to and from out of an already spoken language” (PT 57). Language in every case 
comes before our attempts to master it, and even our technical masteries are derivative from the 
primordial phenomenon of language. And so we do not simply speak language, but rather 
‘language speaks’ to us as well, and indeed in a more originary way. 
It is the task of critical thinking to listen to language speaking to us in this deeper manner. 
To “think critically means to distinguish constantly between that which requires proof for its 
justification”—that is, the objective, scientific truth which requires empirical verification—“and 
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that which, to confirm its truth, demands a simple catching sight of and holding in view”—that 
is, the more primordial truth which requires a witness, rather than a judge. The second demand 
for a ‘simple catching sight of’ harkens back to the earlier Heidegger’s phenomenological 
method, which he defines as ‘to let that which shows itself in itself, show itself in its own self-
showing.’ But the phenomenological has shifted now from the rigorous scientific language of 
Being and Time to a simple, colloquial ‘catching sight of and holding in view.’  
Now Heidegger moves on to the questions in more detail: 
(a) What does it mean to objectify? “To make an object of something, to posit it as an 
object and represent it only as such” (PT 57). It is important to emphasize that to objectify is not 
to interact with an object, as if the object is already there to be interacted with. Rather, it is to 
make an object out of something already there, to posit this thing as an object, and then finally—
and this is most important—to re-present it only as such an object. In this process of objectifying, 
we turn something we witness into an object, re-place it in front of us as an object, and then treat 
it as if it is only an object. The thing recedes behind the objectivity of its re-presentation, leaving 
only the object to be encountered. 
But what is an object? In the Middle Ages the “obiectum signified that which is thrown 
before, held over and against our perceiving, imagination, judging, wishing, and intuiting” (PT 
57-58). It is that which, as ‘thrown’ before our abilities to cognate it, appears as the object of 
perception, imagination, judgment, etc. The subiectum in contrast “signified… that which lies 
present before us from out of itself (not brought before us by representation), whatever is 
present, e.g., things” (PT 58). The subject, contrasted to the object of perception, is the thing-in-
itself which stands independent of our abilities to apprehend it. Yet nevertheless it ‘lies present’ 
before us. It is not the unexperienced thing-in-itself of Kant, which recedes behind its re-
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presentation and does not appear to experience, but rather the thing which shows itself as lying 
present ‘from out of itself’ and stands over against us in experience ‘as itself.’ The medieval 
subiectum is close to the phenomenon (that which shows itself in itself) Heidegger aims for in his 
phenomenology.53  
This medieval conception of the subject and object is “precisely the reverse of what 
subject and object usually mean today: subiectum is what exists independently (objectively), and 
obiectum is what is merely (subjectively) represented” (PT 58). Since Descartes and Kant, the 
object has taken on new signification as that which “exists as standing over and against the 
experience of the natural sciences” (PT 58). Now the object is not only that which stands over 
and against our empirical perception, but more precisely that which stands over and against the 
natural-scientific method of perceiving. Heidegger does not define here the ‘experience of the 
natural sciences’ in contrast to simple experience, but he likely has in mind the scientistic 
method—the ‘logical’ and technical’ construction of sign-systems for the use of science—he had 
already discussed. Essentially, the object since Kant has become that which stands over against 
us with the capacity to be measured as a natural-scientific object. 
If all thinking is objectification, then all thinking is really a measuring of that which 
stands over and against us according to the rigor of natural science. But our “everyday 
experience of things, in the wider sense of the word, is neither objectifying nor a placing over 
against” (PT 58). Heidegger mentions the experience of resting in the garden and “taking delight 
in a blossoming rose” (PT 58). In this case, our taking in of the rose is not an objectification, 
since we do not measure it as something present nor re-present it according to our sense 






even as something standing over and against us: “the redness of the rose neither stands in the 
garden nor can it sway to and fro [like the actual rose]” (PT 58). But nevertheless we “think” the 
redness of the rose and then “tell of it by naming it” (PT 58). The rose’s beauty is no less present 
than its objective presence, even though it is not measurable or even, objectively speaking, 
present. And we think of it and name it when we speak of the rose’s redness. Heidegger also 
cites the statue of Apollo in the museum at Olympia as another example. Of course, we can 
measure the statue objectively by calculating the “physical weight of the marble” as well as its 
“chemical composition” (PT 58). But this scientific measuring surely does not capture the true 
beauty of the statue, and even less does it grasp the statue as a “visage of the god” (PT 58). With 
a pre-suppositional ignorance of the surrounding context of the rose and statue—Heidegger 
would perhaps use the term ‘world’—we remove ourselves from the true thinking and true 
speaking about them.  
(b) What does it mean to think? Given the examples of the rose and the statue, it is “clear 
that thinking and speaking are not exhausted by theoretical and natural-scientific representation 
and statement” (PT 58). While the redness of the rose and the divinity of Apollo do not give 
themselves objectively, they nevertheless happen in experience. This should lead us to a broader 
definition of thinking: the “comportment that lets itself be given, by whatever shows itself in 
whatever way it shows itself, what it has to say of that which appears” (PT 58). Rather than a re-
presenting as an object of that which appears, thinking is more primordially a letting-be-given 
over to a saying and naming of that which shows itself to us in the way it shows itself. It is the 
allowing of a ‘true’ saying of the thing itself as it shows itself to us. “Only the thinking and 
speaking of the natural sciences is objectifying” (PT 58), while all other realms of language think 
and speak in this more primordial way. This is why we have art, for example; were artworks to 
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give themselves only as objects, the beauty of the works, and thus the artworks themselves, 
would never appear as art (PT 59). 
Therefore, Heidegger concludes that the “assertion that all thinking as thinking is 
objectifying is without foundation” (PT 59). We obviously think in other ways besides 
objectification, and to hold otherwise betrays a “disregard of phenomena” (PT 59).  
(c) What does it mean to speak? He answers this question with several other rhetorical 
questions. Rather than a mere “converting what is thought into vocables,” is not speaking rather 
more primordially “a saying, a manifold of that which hearing, i.e., an obedient heeding of what 
appears, lets be said?” (PT 59). Just as we do not think the blooming of the rose as a measuring 
of its objective properties, neither do we speak of the rose according to the vocabulation of 
objective measurement. “When we speak condolence to a sick person and speak to him heart to 
heart, do we make an object of this person?” (PT 59). The doctor might explain planned 
treatment or medicine that will soothe symptoms, but not even that most ‘objective’ help can 
compare to the comfort given by the friend in a ‘heart to heart’ visit. And why? Because in the 
case of the former, the doctor speaks to his patient as an object of work, while in the case of the 
latter, one simply speaks to the sick person as a person. 
And then Heidegger presents his most radical suggestion:  
Is language only an instrument that we employ to manipulate objects? …only a 
work of humans? Is the human being that being that has language in its 
possession? Or is it language that ‘has’ human beings [emphasis mine], insofar as 
they belong to, pay heed to language, which first opens up the world to them and 
at the same time thereby their dwelling in the world? (PT 59) 
 
Heidegger reverses the common assumption that humans ‘have’ language, as if it is an 
instrument among others in our toolkit. Instead, language itself is prior to the human being, as it 
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‘first opens up the world’ to us before we ever grasp hold of it as a tool; language gives us 
‘dwelling in the world,’ not the other way around. 
 (d) Is all thinking a form of speaking and all speaking a form of thinking? Heidegger 
affirms that they do indeed belong together and “form an identity,” for this has been the case 
since the ancient Greeks’ identity of logos and legein (PT 59). But like all ancient Greek 
understandings, this identity has still not been “adequately placed in discussion and 
commensurately experienced” (PT 59). The problem most relevant to the current discussion is 
that the Greeks oriented language towards “stating something about things,” whereas the modern 
concept of language “reinterpreted things to mean objects” (PT 59). The modern notion is a 
doubly removed concept: to speak is a re-presentation through vocables of the object of thought, 
which is already a measured re-presentation of the thing-itself. But for the Greeks, to speak is to 
simply state the truth about things. 
 Here Heidegger introduces his notion of the poetic into the discussion. If we remember 
the more primordial way of thinking and speaking (Heidegger would most likely argue the Greek 
way)—that “thinking is in each case a letting be said of what shows itself, and accordingly a co-
responding (saying) to that which shows itself”—then poetizing reveals itself as a way of 
“pensive saying” no lesser than any other path. Thinking and speaking are most primordially 
letting things show themselves and then responding to them, all within the realm of language. If 
poetizing, as put by Heidegger, is a “pensive saying” of that which shows itself, then certainly it 
would work as a rigorous method of thinking and speaking.  
 This notion of the poetic also gives us further insight that not all thinking and speaking 
are necessarily objectifying. We cannot judge poetizing by “means of the traditional logic of 
statements about objects” (PT 60). In the same way that we cannot simply judge the statue of 
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Apollo according to its measurements and chemical composition, neither can we judge a poem 
according to how well it speaks of the rose’s objective presence. Instead we judge the poem as to 
whether it ‘truly’ speaks of the rose, what this rose ‘means’ in the colloquial sense. Poetry speaks 
of things without reference to objectifying, and so the “thesis that thinking and speaking as such 
necessarily objectify is untenable and arbitrary” (PT 60).  
 While Heidegger’s notion of poetizing may seem strange, crucially it is no different from 
his earlier, more scientific formulation of the phenomenological method. Even in the most 
scientific Being and Time, he defines the phenomenon as ‘that which shows itself in itself,’ and 
he thus defines phenomenology as ‘to let that which shows itself, show itself in its own self 
showing.’ Poetizing is no different. For in poetizing, we ‘let show’ that which shows itself, and 
then we co-respond to it by ‘saying’ it. Heidegger here uses almost the exact language of 
phenomenology in defining what he means by the poetic. The poetic orientation and the 
phenomenological orientation are essentially the same. Here we find a consistency between the 
earlier and later Heidegger, however veiled by a difference in his manner of language. 
 (e) In what sense do thinking and speaking objectify, and in what sense do they not? In 
the natural sciences and in technology, all thinking and speaking have to be objectifying. In this 
realm, “scientific-technological knowing must establish its theme in advance as a calculable, 
causally explicable Gegenstand…” (PT 60). Scientific thinking must present all thought 
objectively, as Kant’s conception of the object, for that is what scientific thinking is. But outside 
this realm there is no need for thinking to restrict itself to natural-scientific objectification. 
 The “growing danger” of the 20th century is “that the scientific-technological manner of 
thinking will spread to all realms of life” [emphasis mine] (PT 60). It is not wrong to think 
scientifically or to view beings as scientistic objects. That manner of thinking has its place and 
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good use. But our time increasingly only thinks in the manner of scientific thinking and views 
beings only as scientistic objects.54 And this restricts our thinking and speaking, and eventually 
even our experience of things and the world, to that of only objectification. 
While the solution to this danger might seem easy enough—to simply broaden our 
thinking to ways resembling times before—the dominance scientific thinking has had in 
modernity makes a solution more difficult than a return to bygone eras. For the “process of 
unrestricted technological objectification” has actually “deformed language” itself into “an 
instrument of reportage and calculable information” (PT 60). Not only does scientific thinking 
treat language as an instrument, it transforms language into something only resembling an 
instrument. Its impulse is naturally totalitarian. The priority of this totalitarian scientism in our 
era creates the danger of moving to a broad, all-encompassing objectification, without possibility 
of turning back. We cannot simply return to earlier paths of thinking, because the scientistic 
perversion may have already scorched those paths so as to make them impassible.  
 Nevertheless, Heidegger’s discussion has shown that language’s nature is much more 
than “an expressing of propositions about objects,” i.e. objectification. Rather, “in what is most 
proper to it,” language “is a saying of that which reveals itself to human beings… and which 
addresses itself to human beings insofar as they do not… close themselves off [by objective 
thinking] from what shows itself” (PT 60). Only by keeping to this fact—that language is most 









itself to us—can we resist the totalitarian impulse to objectify and manipulate existence into a 
measurement of scientific observation. 
 But the proponent of the scientistic view of language might object to all these pointers: 
where is Heidegger’s proof for this more ‘proper’ explication of language? We should note that 
Heidegger does not simply state his position from thin air: in this text (as well as throughout all 
his work) he buttresses his arguments with extensive etymological tracing of concepts and 
phenomenological analyses of experiences. But without making use of these grounds, Heidegger 
counters that the derivative nature of objective thinking “can never be deduced by way of 
scientific proof” (PT 60). We cannot arrive at the proper explication of language by ‘proving’ it; 
if so, then we would still operate under the authority of objective thinking and not yet enter into 
the more primordial and proper nature of thought. Instead, the true nature of thinking and 
speaking “comes only by holding phenomena in view without prejudice” (PT 60). Only an 
attitude which lets things show themselves in themselves as they show themselves—in other 
words, the phenomenological attitude—leads us to the proper mode of thinking and speaking. 
 He illustrates this opinion with a quote from Aristotle’s Metaphysics: “It is the mark of 
not being properly brought up, not to see in relationship to what it is necessary to seek proofs and 
when this is not necessary” (PT 60-61). Far from exemplifying a mature critical mind, the 
constant critical demand for scientific proof betrays a critical immaturity, a restriction of 
experience to only those phenomena that show themselves as objects. This immaturity would 
perhaps show itself most clearly in the one who analyzes the statue of Apollo only according to 
the chemical composition of the marble or measures the dimensions of the carving, rather than 
simply witnessing it for what it is and all it entails—a statue of Apollo. 
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 As a summary of all these pointers, the general answers to the questions are as follows: 
(a) objectifying means to view phenomena as objects and nothing more, and our breadth of 
thinking is by no means exhausted by this manner of viewing; (b) thinking means most properly 
to let oneself be given over to whatever shows itself in whatever it has to say to us (PT 58); (c) 
speaking means to respond to what reveals itself as a letting-be-said of that which reveals itself; 
(d) speaking and thinking do indeed form an identity, but this relationship has yet to be properly 
uncovered—one path of investigation might be that of poetizing; and (e) thinking and speaking 
only objectify in the case of natural-scientific study, and in no other realms should thinking 
necessarily restrict itself to only that which follows scientific proof. 
Now that he has given all these pointers in a philosophical context, Heidegger turns to 
how they may be of use to theology, the third theme of the discussion. Based on what we have 
seen, the original problem stated is not the ‘problem of a nonobjectifying thinking and speaking 
in theology.’ Instead, the problem is that of a “nontechnological, non-natural-scientific thinking 
and speaking in today’s theology” (PT 61). The issue is not whether theologians should use 
supposedly mystical nonobjective language, but rather whether theologians should restrict their 
thinking and speaking to a technological, natural-scientific objectification that only views 
phenomena as objects to be measured.  
Based on this reformulation of the question, the answer should be evident: the “problem 
stated is not a genuine problem insofar as it is geared to a presupposition whose nonsense is 
evident to anyone” (PT 61). Theology by no means should restrict itself to the method of natural-
scientific thinking. “Theology is not a natural science” (PT 61)—so why would it take that yoke 
upon itself? For it would neither produce a genuine theology nor a genuine natural science. In 
this respect, Heidegger is still consistent with his earlier lecture, in that he places theology as a 
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member of the Geisteswissenschaften rather than the Naturwissenschaften. While this may seem 
obvious enough, Heidegger’s context shows that his suggestion is an important reminder for his 
mid-20th century contemporaries. At this time, the followers of Carnap and the logical positivists 
were hoping to apply technical language to non-scientific disciplines, especially the humanities, 
as Heidegger describes in this lecture. Heidegger sees in the current state of 
Geisteswissenschaften a pervasive dominance of objective theory, mechanistic language, and 
technological conceptualization that detracts from the true nature of the humanities. (This is 
perhaps best illustrated by the term ‘political science’ which became so popular in the mid-20th 
century.) Theology, as a member of the Geisteswissenschaften, has a responsibility not to 
succumb to the modern spirit of mechanization in its discourse, i.e. to not turn itself into a 
‘science’ in the most technical sense. 
Hans Jonas answers this critique with an acceptance that, of course, “conceptualization 
and objective language of theory do not do justice, to some extent do violence, to the primary 
content committed to theology’s care…”55 Of course theory cannot fully grasp the revelation 
which is its object of study. He admits that there is also non-objectifying language, and it is 
easily visible in religious contexts such as “in the prophets and psalmists, in the language of 
prayer and confessing and preaching…”56 But that is not the duty of the theologian. For when he 
is practicing theology, he “is neither prophet nor psalmist nor preacher nor poet… but under the 
yoke of theoretical discourse and therefore beholden to objective thought and language.”57 









theology, as the science of this faith, is. And therefore it must be content with objectification as 
the ‘yoke’ it must take upon itself, if indeed it wishes to remain theology. 
First, we must ask whether Jonas and Heidegger argue past each other when discussing 
objective language and theory. Heidegger is arguing against the scientistic method of thinking 
and speaking, not against rigorous thinking itself. The poetic existence he describes is not a 
‘free-floating mysticism,’ but rather a result of careful analysis of the nature of language. And I 
doubt Heidegger would argue that this poetic thinking is free of conceptualization or theorizing 
held to a responsibility of truthfulness towards its subject matter—it is simply a different kind of 
theorizing that is actually more primordial and true to language than the technistic method which 
modern theorizing has accepted so uncritically. Heidegger is simply asserting that the thinking 
and speaking concerning history of a culture or the interpretation of a holy text should look far 
different than a scientific measuring of a cell. Jonas seems to take Heidegger to be arguing 
against all rigorous thinking and conceptualization, which he labels as ‘objective language of 
theory.’ But since Heidegger is arguing against restricting all thinking and speaking to natural-
scientific theory, then Jonas is probably not as opposed to such a notion as he thinks. 
Further than this misunderstanding, however, Jonas’ description of theology is perhaps 
also inaccurate. What is the yoke of theology, except to train prophets and psalmists and 
preachers? There is a difference between teaching the prophetic word and actually doing 
prophecy, but the line between them is not as clear as Jonas contends. Barth always held fast that 
theology is the science for the Church, by the Church, one done by and for the preachers first and 
foremost. It is always the science of Church proclamation. Theology is in its essence practical 
and homiletical. And what better task for the theologian than to craft confessions of faith, prayer 
books, devotionals, hymns, etc.? The Barmen Declaration of 1934—a confession of faith that 
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protested Nazi ideology’s rising authority in the German church—was not drafted by ‘prophets’ 
or ‘poets,’ but by theologians, most notably Barth and the Lutheran Hans Asmussen.58 Such a 
document is not removed from theology. In fact, this seems to be a prime example of the practice 
of theology at its best: a theological corrective of alien concepts trying to gain a foothold in 
Christian discourse. 
 It is not evident at all that theologians should refrain from doing the very things Jonas 
precludes them from. It strikes me that the exact opposite may be the case. In the 1927 lecture 
Heidegger had already described theology as this practical science, which finds its place best in 
exegesis of Scriptures and catechetics and preaching, to the point where theology always has the 
character of a homiletical science. If this were so, then these areas of non-objectifying 
language—the sermon, the confession, the psalm, etc.—are exactly where theology does its 
work. 
Heidegger suggests as much in his conclusion. He states that the whole problem of 
objectifying versus nonobjectifying language “conceals the positive task for theology” (PT 61), 
that is, its task beyond simple criticism and towards construction of concepts, analyses, etc. Its 
true task is “to place in discussion, within its own realm of the Christian faith and out of the 
proper nature of that faith, what theology has to think and how it has to speak” (PT 61). It is not 
to analyze its faith according to ‘objective thought and language,’ as Jonas contends, but instead 
to simply speak within the Christian faith and from out of Christian faith. Theology is simply to 
let speak the revelation which is its founding disclosure. And this will lead to ‘what theology has 






faith thinking and speaking, not thinking and speaking as objectification coming to the Christian 
faith.  
We have already discussed at length the founding disclosure of Christianity, upon which 
both Heidegger and Bonhoeffer agree: the cross. With this in mind, we find Heidegger stating 
that Christian theology’s task is most fundamentally to let the cross speak. If the cross does 
indeed, as Bonhoeffer argues, claim to be the sole initiator and unity of the human being, then 
Heidegger would certainly agree that theology’s task is to follow this claim in its investigations. 
Again, such a claim must be followed by the actuality of the cross’ ontological basis, but the 
later Heidegger would at least allow this claim to make its case. 
This leads Heidegger to make one last subtle but quite significant suggestion for 
theology. The task just mentioned finally calls to consider “whether theology can still be a 
science—because presumably it should not be a science at all” [emphasis mine] (PT 61). 
Whereas Heidegger just asserted that theology is obviously not a natural science—this is in 
keeping with the earlier lecture and should strike no one as controversial—now he goes one step 
further and suggests theology is not even a science. The domain of theology is faith, and this 
faith makes no demand for scientific objectification. Rather, it only calls for, as Heidegger had 
stated in the 1927 lecture, a continuing cultivation of faithfulness, and this faithfulness is 
Christian existence. Cultivation of Christianness happens not through the scientistic method 
(which is alien and, on Heidegger’s account, actually restricts the apprehension of phenomena to 
that of mere objectification) but rather through the simple speaking from faith. If this is the case, 
then should theology bother to call itself a science? ‘Presumably,’ Heidegger suggests, not at all.  
We should note here that, at this point in his life, Heidegger does not consider good 
philosophy (in his terms, true ‘thinking’) as science, either. Heidegger’s goal is that more 
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primordial thinking lying behind metaphysics and its children in the positive sciences. Whereas 
in the original lecture, Heidegger still kept to rigorous scientific language according to his 
concept of the phenomenological-existential analytic of Dasein, now he prefers the most 
colloquial and seemingly un-scientific of terms and theories. For Heidegger to suggest theology 
do likewise to philosophy—to discern whether it should even consider itself a science at all— 
suggests that now Heidegger sees a kinship between philosophy and theology. 
 Jonas himself sees this, as he contrasts the earlier Heidegger in the case of his lecture—
which he quotes incorrectly, stating that theology as a positive science is a science of God and 
therefore not “primary thinking”59—with the later Heidegger, who “as an afterthought, heeding 
the plea of theologians who wished their discipline freed from the odor of science… (at least 
orally) [permitted] theology to be added to poetry and philosophy as possible modes of primal 
thinking.”60 Whereas the earlier Heidegger placed theology as a positive science, the later 
Heidegger ‘at least orally’ allows theology a place as one of the ‘modes’ of primordial thinking. 
Jonas’ skepticism of Heidegger’s sincerity towards theology notwithstanding, we do see that he 
himself recognizes a shift from the earlier Heidegger to the later Heidegger concerning theology. 
The later Heidegger sees in theology, not a positive science, but a simple thinking about 
Christian faith which springs from out of the Christian faith and speaks to name what that faith 
reveals. 
Heidegger closes the appendix with one last addition, an apologetic of sorts for poetry. 
He remarks that in the poet Rilke’s work we find a phrase— “Song is existence”—which 








‘song’ as a “poetic thinking” is a “not coveting” and a “not soliciting,” an existence that simply 
stands “in the presence of… and for the god…” a “simple willingness that wills nothing, counts 
on no successful outcome” (PT 61). In its essence, this poetic existence is simply “letting the 
god’s presence be said” (PT 61). Here we find, according to Heidegger, the best 
phenomenological manner of thinking and speaking about the divine: not coming to it with 
outside presuppositions or distorting it with metaphysical structures, but simply letting it show 
itself in itself and allowing it to speak for itself. 
But it is important to note that in this manner of language we do not “posit and represent 
anything as standing over and against us or as an object” (PT 61). There is no “comprehending 
representation” happening in this thinking. But this is not its defect; it is its privilege to simply 
stand in the presence of the god and allow the divine to speak. It is an allowance of revelation 
that makes all later thinking and speaking possible.  
And now we are no longer in the realm of objectifying concepts. We are now dealing 
with that which underlies all these concepts: “the being of whatever is and shows itself in each 
instance” (PT 62). We are now in the realm of being—that is, to return to a scientific term of 
which the later poetic Heidegger may be skeptical, ontology.  
Heidegger, the philosopher, cannot tell the theologian his place within the sciences. But 
he does conclude that it is obvious theology is not a natural science. It belongs with the 
Geisteswissenschaften, as it did in the earlier lecture, and these studies have a duty not to 
succumb to the temptation to think themselves as ‘objective’ sciences like physics or biology. 
But now he goes further than the original lecture. He suggests that the best way for theology to 
be theology is to let its own faith speak from out of itself rather than apply some alien 
philosophical system, which is again consistent with the lecture and even his whole thought 
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concerning Christianity.61 But he adds that his notion of poetic thinking might be a good route 
for theology to take: to simply stand in the presence of its Christian God and let that God speak 
to the theologian. In this way the theologian allows his faith to speak from out of itself, and 
certainly without recourse to any alien system—at least, anything beyond the phenomenological 
orientation to let beings speak from out of themselves.  While this poetic orientation may itself 
be alien to Christianity—there is certainly no talk of a ‘phenomenological orientation’ in the 
Bible—it is by no means a dogmatic domination from outside. It is only a general orientation 
towards beings that aims to let them show themselves in their own self-showing, one which 
seems fruitful for a theologian whose aim is to let his founding revelation speak from itself. 
This does not at all mean that theology and philosophy are now one. For theology still 
only speaks from its faith, from the disclosure of its founding revelation of the cross and not any 
free-standing orientation, while for its part philosophy remains the free-thinking 
phenomenological orientation of Dasein towards being-in-general. Theology is to its very core 
theological, and this may still keep it as the ‘mortal enemy’ of philosophy which Heidegger had 

















other as equals without ‘all the questions about dominance, preeminence and validity of the 
sciences.’  
Being as presence can show itself in various modes of presence. What is present 
does not have to stand over against us; what stands over against us does not have 
to be empirically perceived as an object (PT 62). 
 
We have no reason to restrict being—of the divine or otherwise—to that which must ‘be 
empirically perceived as an object.’ And theology has no reason to keep itself from the ‘various 
modes of presence’ available to it beyond scientistic observation in its explication of the 
Christian faith, since faith is nothing other than all of Christian existence. 
I contend further that Heidegger now subtly allows for theology a space he previously 
closed off to it: that is, the realm of being, through the phenomenological orientation of poetic 
existence, which simply stands in the presence of the god and allows it to show itself as it shows 
itself, in its own self-showing. There is also the poetic responsibility to call back to this god, to 
‘name’ it and name the existence marked by the divine presencing—a responsibility now given 
to the theologian. 
 But what of the Christian theologian? The Christian God has revealed himself on the 
cross. Perhaps Heidegger would say to those theologians with Christian commitments that they 
should stand under the shadow of this cross, in the presence of the crucified God, and, as Luther 
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